The issue of the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace treaty, which Nikol Pashinyan has been incessantly promoting both domestically and internationally for the past four years, seems to have reached a critical juncture. On March 13, the parties officially announced that the 17 points of the document have been mutually agreed upon and that it is fully ready for signing. This development has been welcomed by the foreign policy departments of several countries, international organizations, and other stakeholders. However, despite the conclusion of negotiations, the cycle of security-related anxieties and disappointments in Armenia remains unbroken.

Despite government assurances that the public is supposedly well informed about the content of the treaty, large segments of Armenian society remain in the dark. As always, the negotiation process has been conducted behind closed doors. Even opposition MPs in the National Assembly are unaware of the infamous 17 points, as their access to classified information is often unlawfully restricted by the highest-ranking official himself. This is the same individual who, when previously questioned by journalists about what was being negotiated with Azerbaijan, boasted: "we negotiate whatever is needed."

Critical information, statements, and other materials concerning Armenia often come to light through Azerbaijani sources or directly from the military-political leaders of that country. Meanwhile, Armenia’s leaders, under the pretext of "negotiating whatever is needed," have ceded Artsakh—the second Armenian legitimate republic that had taken the path of self-determination and sovereignty. Now, they appear to be laying the groundwork for the dismemberment of Mother Armenia itself. The so-called 17 points of the peace treaty may well be a prelude to this, resembling 17 yataghan-wielding janissaries hidden under the guise of diplomacy.

Most likely, the Armenian side was forced to withdraw its proposals regarding two key points, which had not been agreed upon for a long time after being sent from Yerevan to Baku more than ten times and returned unchanged, and conceded to Azerbaijan’s terms simply to eliminate obstacles to the treaty's prompt signing. For Pashinyan, this "piece of paper" has become a pathological obsession—an idée fixe. It is his only tangible “achievement” in the four post-war years, reached in intervals between making omelets, cycling, and other trivial pursuits.

One of the last two contentious points of the document, on which agreement had not been reached for almost 4-5 months, reportedly relates to the withdrawal of the third-party forces, specifically European observers from the border, while the other concerns the reciprocal withdrawal of international lawsuits. The Armenian party persisted for a while or pretended to persist, since both points clearly favor Azerbaijan. Removing foreign observers along non-demarcated sections of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border frees Aliyev’s hands for further aggression, while the reciprocal withdrawal of lawsuits disproportionately benefits Azerbaijan. In return for two relatively weak demands from Baku, Armenia is relinquishing five substantial claims that have evidently unnerved Aliyev.

It is hardly a stretch to assert that the remaining 15 points also align overwhelmingly with Azerbaijan’s interests. Their purely Azerbaijani "origin" is evident, yet the Armenian authorities continue to avoid publishing their details. Yerevan’s policy of concessions amounts to a trajectory of state erosion, further enabled by Azerbaijan’s maximalist tactics of extracting concessions through the persistent threat of war. This creeping capitulation, driven by Azerbaijan's unrelenting demands, shows no signs of abating regardless of how many "papers" are signed. Moreover, it remains uncertain whether Aliyev will ultimately sign this treaty.

The Azerbaijani leader has already imposed additional conditions: amendments to the Constitution of Armenia, the extradition of the prominent figures who committed "military crimes against Azerbaijan," downsizing Armenia’s armed forces, disarmament, and the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group. He has declared that only after these preconditions are met will he sign the peace treaty. In his arrogance, the dictator of Baku has definitely confused peace with slavery.